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UPWARD CONTEMPT 
WILLIAM IAN MILLER 
University ofMichigan 
CONTEMPT AND HUMILIATION, contempt and shame go hand in 
hand.1 Actions that should shame us, styles of self-presentation hatshould 
humiliate usif we are socially competent enough to have such a purchase on 
ourselves, are those actions and styles that generate and justify the contempt 
of others for us. Or, changing the causal order: one's contempt ofus will 
generate shame or humiliation in us if we concur with the judgment of our 
contemptibility, thatis, if the contempt is justified,2 or indignation a d even 
vengeful fury if it is unjustified. Contempt is thus amechanism ofranking 
people or of contesting relative rankings and as such has an intensely political 
significance. 
Contempt raises amyriad of issues involving the relation of emotions to 
various ocial orders, to the justice of those social orders, and to the micro- 
politics of face-to-face interaction n those social orders. I want o narrow my 
range here. What I wish to speculate about is the nature of something I 
will call upward contempt, that is, the contempt that he low have for the 
high; I will then make some suggestions about how this might play out in 
different social and political regimes: heroic society, the ancien regime, and 
in democracy.3 
By some accounts the notion of upward contempt involves a definitional 
impossibility. Contempt, after all, is usually captured by the metaphor f 
"looking down on someone or something," and this metaphor is even acted 
out concretely inthe common facial expression ofthe one-sided smile and 
of the raised head, the partially closed eyes which view askance the offending 
contemptible person. However, let me do the necessary justification f
upward contempt slowly and indirectly as a matter of the exposition that 
A UTHOR'S NOTE: This essay has benefitedfrom comments by Don Herzog, Kathleen Koehler, 
Phoebe Ellsworth, Robert Bartlett, and Steve Croley, to whom thanks are due. 
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follows. Suffice it to say for the present that what I mean to capture isthe 
contempt teenagers have for adults, women for men, servants for masters, 
workers for bosses, Jews for Christians, Blacks for Whites, uneducated for 
the educated, and so forth. Since all of us have at least been teenagers once, 
I assume we all have had the experience of being the contemner in upward 
contempt. Please do not ake that last statement to mean that I think all upward 
contempts are the same or are triggered bythe same conditions. The Black, 
the Jew, the woman, the teenager, and the worker may all share an inferior 
status, but that does not mean that heir inferiority s constituted in the same 
way. A quick example: teenagers will be automatically emancipated from 
their estricted status simply by marking time. Blacks, on the other hand, are 
stuck. Jews can convert and in a non-racially-based nti-Semitic regime that 
can undo their inferior status. Even women suffer different styles of disable- 
ment depending on whether they are single, married, ivorced, or widowed, 
or whether fertile or barren, old or young. 
Consider this tale of competing contempts. Last summer I hired amason 
to do some work on my house. He was a large beefy man, with several tattoos 
of the conventional sort: dragons, Vikings, and other virile Marvel comic- 
book-like figures. His jeans were worn low so that when he bent over his rear 
fissure was exposed.4 He looked fairly tough, bearing the air of someone for 
whom the receipt of physical pain was not as much a cause of fear as the 
giving of it was of pleasure. He had already been on the job for a few days 
when I rode up on my bicycle, backpack on my back, said hello, and 
continued peddling back to the garage. The mason said to my wife, "he a 
teacher?" The failure of the "is" to introduce that question only captures some 
of the contemptuousness of his tone. I went back to make some small talk, 
comment on the job and how it was going, and then took my leave. 
He and I each have no small amount of contempt for each other. But our 
contempts are not constructed in quite the same way. His for me is less 
ambivalent than mine for him, riddled as mine is with conflicting designs and 
commitments. Letme flesh out first some of the bases of my contempt for 
him before tackling my contemptibility in his eyes. First were the tattoos. I 
took them as signs of his will to vulgarity (or at least of his will to offend 
types like me). He not only did not disown them, but displayed them proudly. 
His pride in them underwrote the basis of my contempt, for were he ashamed, 
then I might feel embarrassed onhis behalf. Or I may still feel contempt but 
it would be a benign contempt, almost undifferentiable from pity and com- 
passion, not the sensation of wonderment mixed with disgust and revulsion 
the tattoos induced in me. His physicality, hisobliviousness toseeking pain 
(the nontattooed arealways treated to stories about he painfulness ofgetting 
tattooed), his lack of concern for-or even knowledge of-what might offend 
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me might have made me wary, if not quite fearful.' I could, without being 
paranoid, read in his style an affront. Hewas bigger, stronger, and tougher 
than I was and between men such assessments count for something. I suppose 
I could respect him for his willingness toaffront me or for his simply not 
giving a damn what I thought. But unabashed vulgarity simply does not make 
it easy to grant even grudging respect on that account. Itseems that whatever 
wariness he generated in me did not go to engendering respect for him; it only 
undennined certain foundations of respect for myself, ascontemptibly un- 
physical, miserably unmartial. The whole ncounter was as far as the total of 
respect in the world goes less than zero-sum. 
Take the exposure of his hind parts when he bent over. This produced a 
contempt that ouches both on amusement and disgust. The amusement is 
driven by my utter inability toimagine actually choosing to self-present i  
such a fashion; or, if in fact here had been no choosing, by the incomprehen- 
sibility of being so oblivious to one's body and presentability. The amusement 
is derisory ina way but the smile is not consciously willed as it often is in 
certain styles of sardonic laughter. The comedy is genuine and experienced 
as such.6 He is playing the clownish vulgar mechanic: he is in the mold of 
Bottom the Weaver or Curly, Mo, and Larry. This is the amusement of
contempt and displays an intimate connection between some styles of con- 
tempt and the comic.7 
Nevertheless, this Rabelaisian kind of comic grotesquerie edges toward 
horror too; it would not take much for the base mechanic to metamorphose 
into amonster. Horror can be frightening, or itcan be repulsive and disgust- 
ing.8 And while contempt can be a kind of defense against a fear of the 
contemptible, it also bears ome close connections with disgust. The same 
aspects of his style that amused me also came close to disgusting me. In a 
sense, he was contaminating. Disgust is the visceral end point of contempt. 
While both disgust and contempt come heavily mediated by culture, itstill 
makes sense to conceive of disgust as somewhat more immediate, less 
thought dependent than contempt. Disgust is triggered bythe sense that our 
body has been invaded by impurity; it thus prompts somatic reactions like 
retching, agging, vomiting, spitting out.9 Contempt, on the other hand, 
depends more on notions of rank, of proper ordering, ofdecorum. It is 
complexly intertwined with the rich rules of social and cultural ordering that 
both elicits it and is maintained byit. 
I hope that he reader might suspend his condemnation of the failure of 
my account to accord with pieties that I actually accept as a matter of political 
commitment.10 I need to spin afew things out a little further: at the same time 
I was having feelings of contempt for him Iwas also, as I hinted just a minute 
ago, indulging inno small amount of self-contempt, for my lack of physical- 
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ity, for my certainty hat I could not win a fight with im, for my doubts about 
the social value of what I do, andfor myfeeling contemptuous f him while 
at the same time realizing (or supposing) he was utterly untroubled byhis 
contempt for me. Although we both live in the third century of American 
democracy and liberal democratic political nd moral theory, those traditions 
only seem to undercut my contempt for him, not his for me. For those styles 
of political, moral, and social thought did much more to delegitimate down- 
ward contempt than they did upward contempt. One could even hazard the 
suggestion (which I will return to later) that democratic theory does more 
than free upward contempt from having to make a pretense of hiding itself 
in the servant's quarters; it actually changes the style of that contempt."' And 
we could further suggest that one of the defining markers that distinguishes 
upward from downward contempt indemocratic societies is the greater 
likelihood that he downward contempt will be accompanied by a sense of 
its own doubtful legitimacy, whether this sense be experienced as guilt, 
shame, or a mere sense of concern and doubt. This sense of doubt even makes 
the downward contemner wonder if his firm sense that he other experiences 
no anxiety at all for his own feelings of contempt is simply another manifes- 
tation of his contempt for the lower classes, seeing them again as insensate. 
This is, however, to make my contempt less sure of itself than it was 
actually experienced, even though my feelings have a very questionable 
legitimacy. I actually had to remind myself that he is of equal value with me, 
of the same dignity, and so forth. Moreover, he merited respect for the skill 
he had, and for doing his job well, for which indeed I did respect him. 
Nevertheless, I cannot shake my contempt for what he is independent of his 
role as a competent mason. It is there with a vengeance, inspite of my lack 
of confidence about its justifiability. Thesyndrome I am suffering from isnot 
liberal guilt. That is the sentiment one feels for being privileged when one 
doubts the justifiability of one's entitlement to such privilege. My contempt 
is not so much tinged with guilt or even self-doubt as it is colored by a sense 
of wonderment that my contempt is so incorrigibly part of me, uneradicable 
by all the years of official discourse to the contrary. Although I feel a sense 
of my own failure to live up to some high-toned principles about human 
equality, dignity, and value, I also experience a genuine pleasure in thinking 
myself superior to those I feel contempt for. 
The true source of my uneasiness is not my own failure to live up to noble 
principles that at one level of consciousness I accept and admire, but he more 
down-to-earth matter that I discern his contempt for me and fear he may be 
getting the best of me. It is quite clear to me that he form his contempt takes 
is that he does not care what I think of him (with a small exception for 
preferring that I think he is doing a good job rather than a bad one). He is 
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indifferent to my contempt and I am not indifferent to his. He is unambivalent 
in his contempt (at least as a conscious matter). To the extent his contempt is 
tinged with envy, he reinterprets theenvy as resentment that someone as 
unprepossessing as me should have such an easy life. 
I feel rather confident that I can construct much of his contempt for me, 
not only because he so plainly manifests i  but also because I am no stranger 
to feeling this kind of contempt either, ecalling quite well having felt it for 
the type I have come to be; for even if I like to think myself differentiable 
from the others he associates me with, I expect him to make no such 
distinctions, or am I even confident that my sense that I am distinguishable 
from those I am grouped with is anything but a delusion.12 Hewould see me 
as a feminized male. My build, my bike, my backpack, and my profession 
mark me as something contemptible in his eyes. Ido not work with my hands. 
Whatever skills I might have are dubiously magical, intangible, never eally 
verifiable. I was a "teacher" inhis eyes: someone who gives people what hey 
do not want when they do not need it."3 
If he cared to notice, he might have found it contemptible in me that I cared 
to have him think me a man like him. He might have discerned that ever so 
slightly I was aping him back to him. At one level this could be seen just as 
competent and graceful condescension in the eighteenth-century sense. He 
puts on his best manners and I somewhat lter mine downward and we meet 
in the middle, each having compromised out of respect for the encounter if 
not quite for each other. But he might pick up that I was not quite dealing 
from a position of strength, that I was in short rying too hard; to the 
discerning eye I was somewhat undignified. Here my commitments to 
democratic egalitarianism only made me a fool in his eyes. Iwould have been 
better off to have dealt with im with akind of cordial aloofness. I wondered 
if he would have had the same contempt for a corporate executive, an 
insurance salesman, a woman? He unquestionably won the encounter. 
His contempt for me, unlike mine for him, was unlikely to have been 
mingled with orror or disgust. I simply was a matter of indifference to him 
other than as a source of livelihood. My role was of a one-shot dispenser of 
money, nothing else. And then there is the suspicion that for all his indiffer- 
ence the culture's determination of status is not without some effect. I was 
by the conventional otion of the higher class. I lived in the better neighbor- 
hood. This makes me, for all my effeminacy in his eyes, less a pollutant in
his world than he could be in mine. Although I was contemptibly risible in 
his eyes, the fact hat I was of the higher class made me not have the capacity 
to pollute. What is the higher in higher class if not the capacity to put more 
space, real physical space between yourself and others, to be less polluting 
even to those who find you contemptible? 
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This rich and utterly routine interaction raises many issues, only three of 
which I will pursue further: (1)the content and mechanics of some varieties 
of contempt, (2) the particular features ofupward contempt that distinguish 
it from the usual downward contempt, and (3) how social and political 
arrangements might affect the moral economies of competing versions of 
contempt. 
THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF CONTEMPT 
"Those things which we neither Desire, nor Hate, we are said to Con- 
temne: Contempt being nothing else but an immobility, or contumacy ofthe 
Heart, in resisting the action of certain things." Thus Hobbes in Leviathan. 
Contempt in this formulation looks like indifference. And although this 
formulation is not unimaginable to us as a species of contempt, i  hardly 
accords with our core notion of contempt. Yet Hobbes is clear that his version 
of contempt is a passion, not simply the absence of affect.'4 Hume's contempt 
looks something more like how we usually envisage it. For him it is a mix of 
pride and hatred."5 Pride gives the necessary downward direction and the 
elevation of oneself in relation to the person contemned; hatred supplies the 
moral judgment involved in the comparison. But contempt is much richer 
than either of these formulations. Seldom is an emotion ever experienced 
unalloyed with other emotions. Itis no easy job, for instance, toseparate a 
pure xperience ofhumiliation from its accompanying despair or indignation; 
it is difficult to experience jealousy independent of anger; grief independent 
of frustration. Contempt is especially rich in the protean powers we under- 
stand it to have in being able to combine with amultitude ofother passions 
and sentiments. Werecognize contempt as a complex which can be made of 
various admixtures of affect and social style. Without taking the time to give 
a rich account of each commingling, most of us will have no trouble 
imagining contempt colluding with pity as well as scorn and derision; 
bemusement as well as smugness, haughtiness, disgust, revulsion, and horror; 
love (as with pets and even children) aswell as hatred, indifference, disdain, 
snubbing, ignoring, sneering, and an array of sentiments which motivate 
various forms of laughter and smiles: the sardonic, the sarcastic, and the 
indulgent (again as with pets and children). What is common to all these 
experiences is one's relation to someone over whom one is claiming some 
superiority, hevery assertion of the claim being identical with the manifes- 
tation of contempt. Contempt is itself the claim to relative superiority. This 
helps explain the nearly polar extremes we suppose for contempt-from pity 
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to disdain, from hate to love, from bemusement to loathing: all these are 
possible attitudes the higher may assume vis-a-vis the lower. 
Whatever might be the affects and motives that constitute any particular 
instance of contempt, we should not be surprised to see its styles and 
meanings intimately connected tothe social and cultural setting in which it 
arises. Rigid hierarchical societies or societies of clearly marked status will 
have their contempts tend in one direction, while the contempts of democratic 
culture, or of roughly egalitarian honor cultures, would tend to have its 
contempts constituted in another way. 
Take Hobbes's contempt again. This looks like the contempt ofcompla- 
cency, of never doubting your superiority and rank. It is the contempt ofthe 
master for the man, the lord for the villein, the lady for the maid. These lower 
simply do not merit strong affect; hey are noticed only sufficiently so as to 
know that hey are not notice worthy. One can condescend to treat hem 
decently; one may in rare circumstances even pity them, but they are really 
of a different and innocuous species. Not insects, because insects might 
disgust; hese people are the safely disattendable. Weare not unfamiliar with 
this contempt ofcomplacent indifference ev n in democratic cultures. Itstill 
flourishes inspite of democratic principle in particular contexts in which 
status is fixed and mobility across rankings is relatively rare. We thus find 
this kind of contempt inthe posture of some bosses toward their secretaries, 
of professionals for the maintenance staff, and so on. There are two qualifiers 
here. First, I am speaking of one-on-one encounter. It takes an extraordinary 
amount of complacency to disattend large groupings ofthe low. Such group- 
ings move the contempt ofindifference to the realms of terror and horror (see 
note 8). And this is why societies that depended on the rigid structuring that 
enables this kind of Hobbesian contempt are careful to regulate he conditions 
under which the low can assemble. We may propose that, if the superiors feel 
secure and can indulge complacency, wewill see the Hobbesian style of 
contempt; if, however, the groups are at war or for whatever reason the 
superior finds the lower not safely disattendable, then we might expect 
differently motivated and constituted contempts a in the contempts of 
anti-Semitism, racism, classicism, and sexism, with sexism perhaps 
marching to a different beat. Here it is not indifference, but loathing, 
horror, disgust, hatred, cruelty that accompanies and constitutes the con- 
tempt. Second, the indifference that is this kind of Hobbesian contempt 
depends on a precise knowledge ofwhere you stand relative to the other and 
of a corresponding confidence in the disattendability of he other. The country 
bumpkin who through ignorance fails to understand when he should efer is 
not showing contempt in this Hobbesian way, even though is ignorance may 
give offense."6 
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Now change the setting so that we are not confirming or establishing 
hierarchical re ations across large status demarcations but are contending for 
esteem and standing within a status, that is, in a basically egalitarian setting. 
Here we would expect o see a different style of contempt, the one we usually 
mean when we refer to treating someone with contempt. This is the treatment 
we give to let someone know that hey have failed, that hey are not measuring 
up, that they are claiming more for themselves than they can worthily 
discharge. This is the contempt ofthe bloodfeuder for the antagonist hehas 
on the run, of the courtier whose manners are more refined than the other 
courtiers, ofthe academic for his nonpublishing colleague. This is not the 
contempt for the disattendable, but for those we might become or have just 
recently ceased to be. It is more active than Hobbes's contempt, more apart 
of consciously assumed strategies ofinteraction. It isthe contempt that is the 
correlative ofshaming or humiliating others for their failures to maintain 
group norms. 
This active contempt is part of the system of challenge and riposte in the 
process of status acquisition a d status maintenance that is the game of honor. 
To suffer that latter kind of contempt is, as articulated by a variety of 
eighteenth-century mo alists and not so moralists, he worst hat can befall a
man. It is the open denial to oneself of what one considers one's due. For 
Fielding such contempt was crueler than murder."7 And Lord Chesterfield 
harps on it continually to his son of which one example will suffice: 
However frivolous a company may be, still, while you are among them, do not show 
them, by your inattention, that you think them so; but rather take their tone, and conform 
in some degree to their weakness, instead of manifesting your contempt for them. There 
is nothing that people bear more impatiently, or forgive l ss, than contempt; and all injury 
is much sooner forgotten than insult.18 
These men moved in circles where they felt heir self-esteem and status at 
risk from a number of directions: from above by those whose favor they 
sought, from the side by those with whom they competed for the favors of 
those above, by those upstarts immediately below whose very presence 
would devalue the position they had already attained. Ifthey could still rest 
secure among their servants, they could not rest secure among the witlings, 
the coxcombs, the insolent, and the impudent would-bes.19 
The contempt these men fear is the contempt from those they honor, 
respect, and fear. This is the contempt that disciplines and establishes the 
authority and superiority of the contemner. Not everyone can inflict ontempt 
that hurts. Thus to Chesterfield the contempt that upstarts ingood circum- 
stances how for those who "cannot afford as fine clothes, as good an 
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equipage, or who have not as much money in their pockets" isan "insolent 
contempt," a contempt that exposes such insolent upstarts o justifiable 
contempt from judges like himself. This kind of insolent contemptuousness 
is incessantly pilloried in comedies of manners; these mean souls of whom 
we might take Mrs. Elton, in Emma, as one of many instances, are too dim 
to recognize merit, rank, or where they stand in the eyes of real blue blood. 
The contempt that comes from this kind of contemptible person can still cause 
real pain but not of the soul-killing variety that he contempt ofthose whose 
merit you concede can. Contempt from these latter can be a kind of moral 
and social death. 
Let me pursue a different matter for abit. One school of emotion theorists 
in modern experimental psychology, following Darwin and to some extent 
James, have hunted for the motions independent of heir social and cognitive 
settings and contents and sought them in the adaptive l gacy of the species 
and thus in the hardwiring of the human animal. These theories tend to limit 
the number of core emotions tothose that have distinctive facial expressions 
that indicate their presence. And so it is that contempt often appears on the 
list of core emotions, along with joy, sadness, anger, surprise, interest, 
disgust, fear, shame/shyness, and guilt.20 Contempt creates ome problems 
for this kind of analysis that he others do not because there is not just one 
expression that serves to express the sentiment, or for that matter isany one 
expression capable of doing service for the entire range of sentiments that 
can be subsumed within the broad notion of contempt. Darwin, for instance, 
discusses contempt incompany with disdain and disgust, which discussion 
follows on the heels of sneering and defiance in his preceding chapter.21 
Disdain he views as implying a more angry frame of mind than contempt, 
while disgust focuses on things offensive tothe sense of taste, "nevertheless 
extreme contempt, oras it is often called loathing contempt, hardly differs 
from disgust" (p. 253). Contempt, like disdain, sneering, and defiance, is
often indicated by a slight uncovering ofthe canine tooth on one side of the 
face. This same expression can imperceptibly metamorphose into a smile, 
which as Darwin notes, "may be real, although one of derision and this 
implies that he offender is so insignificant that he excites only amusement; 
but the amusement is generally a pretense." We all know under what circum- 
stances the amusement is apretense. It is a kind of defensive posture masking 
horror and revulsion. But the amusement eed not be a pretense either; it 
could just as well be a sign of the genuine laughability of certain kinds of 
contemptibility. 
The one-sided smirking smile (notice how many types of smiles we 
distinguish t at are likely to be one-sided: the smirk, the derisory grin, the 
sardonic, the wry, the sneer, etc.) is associated with dismissiveness. In this it 
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differs from the other classic ontempt expression which Darwin represents 
in a plate showing a woman with partially closed eyes that may or may not 
be looking askance, the nose raised up with acontraction upward of the upper 
lip in an expression that verges on the expression we show for disgust. This 
represents something other than dismissiveness. It shows that the thing 
contemned is vile, revolting, and beneath contempt, a phrase that once 
probably indicated Hobbesian indifference, buthas come to indicate instead 
the loathing contempt that Darwin refers to. This is the sign of despising. 
These two expressions differ inhow they style one's relation to the would-be 
offense and offender. The one finds nothing funny in having to be present 
with something one perceives a undifferentiable from excrement; the other, 
the one-sided smile, recognizes, if not quite welcomes, the rough comedy of 
having to suffer fools and clowns. And clowns are significantly lesspolluting 
than feces. 
I do not have the space to play this out in all its suggestive d tail. Suffice 
it to say that under the rubric of contempt lies a complex of strategy, 
expression, and affect. By way of reprise, the only thing we can say with 
reasonable confidence is that whatever the precise style of the particular 
contempt, whether Hobbesian indifference, or visceral loathing and disgust, 
what is always being played out in every instance isthe articulation of relative 
social and moral value. Contempt is the emotional complex that articulates 
and maintains hierarchy, status, rank, and respectability. And differentiated 
status and rank are the eliciting conditions ofcontempt. Sowhat we have is 
a kind of feedback loop in which contempt creates the structures which 
generate he capacity for contempt. And there is good reason to believe that 
the particular style of the contempt will be intimately connected with the 
precise social and political rrangements in which it takes place. 
UPWARD CONTEMPT 
I would like to suggest that he notion of contempt moving upward ismore 
than just a play on words, more than quickly dismissed by a quick relativist 
move of the sort hat asks: "By whose view are you judging high and low? 
Surely, you must admit, he mason did not feel himself below you at all, so 
to the extent he felt superior to you he could hold you in contempt ofthe 
classic variety." I do not dispute that upward contempt involves seeing the 
higher party as contemptible and thus as risible and in some respects a lesser. 
It is contempt, after all, we are dealing with. The lower might know himself 
more intelligent, physically stronger, more moral, better looking, and so forth. 
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But what I am positing is that upward contempt will still have a different feel, 
a different s yle. We have already noted some: (1) that upward contempt is
less likely to be coupled with disgust and that it is thus less concerned to 
protect oneself from pollution; (2) that in democratic settings upward con- 
tempt, unlike contempt proper, is secure in its legitimacy. Upward contempt, 
in spite of the fact that it allows the lower to claim superiority regarding a 
particular attribute, does not take place in a vacuum. The person below knows 
that hey are below in the eyes of the other, knows that hey are in some sense 
held in contempt by those others, whereas the higher by the usual conventions 
of rank can indulge themselves even legitimately inthe thought that hey are 
held in esteem, admired, or envied by the lower.22 
This knowledge is not without consequences. This means that upward 
contempt is played out in a larger setting of power relations that define its 
ranges and meanings. If conventional contempt constitutes hierarchy, upward 
contempt makes for some psychic space for the low. It never loses the sense 
of its own limits; it knows itself to be secondary, a kind of remedy for the 
contempt that is rained down on one, never constitutive, always reactive. In 
other words, no matter how contemptible I might be to the mason I hired, the 
fact remains that I hired him, not he me.23 There follows from this another 
crucial distinction between upward and conventional contempt. The con- 
tempt of the low for the high, unlike conventional contempt, will often be 
coupled with a distinctive kind of Schadenfreude. Ifthe pleasure of normal 
contempt isoften tinged with complacency, self-satisfaction, a d smugness, 
or even with a simple and less culpable delight in one's own superiority, the 
pleasure in upward contempt is seldom separable from the knowledge that 
the superior you hold in contempt ishumiliating himself, is, in short, looking 
foolish. Notice that in this case it is not that the lower person is necessarily 
seeing the high as beneath him, as lower, in other words, than the low, but 
only as seeing the high as lower than where the high sees himself.24 Let me 
expand upon this briefly. 
Occupying the high position is not without i s risks. It supposes, of course, 
superiority, demonstrable superiority. The high have to maintain the stan- 
dards that justify admiration and deference or suffer contempt and resentment 
for failing to maintain them.25 We must speak in probabilities here, but it 
might justly be supposed that upward contempt is both generated by and 
generates the capacity to discern and expose hypocrisy in superiors. Upward 
contempt isoften intimately connected with the revelation of hypocrisy in its 
object, the identification fhypocrisy fueling and justifying the resentment 
as well as the mirthful derision that will be its consequence. This process will 
tend, in other words, to admit he authority of the higher while revealing the 
higher's moral unworthiness for the position they occupy. The style of 
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upward contempt will then often be characterized by a certain satiric mock- 
ery. The satiric drives a contempt that finds in the higher not so much the 
bases for disgust as the basis for scornful laughter. If one cannot quite render 
them clowns and fools, satire can surely show them to be the knaves they are. 
Upward contempt inthis tyle then does not deny the superior power of the 
other; it just finds the hypocrisy ofthe high to be the substance of a kind of 
moralistic, sardonic, and bitter comedy. 
The exposure of hypocrisy and the upward contempt that accompanies it 
depends on the high not adhering totheir own publicly stated standards of 
conduct and virtue. And the bitterness of the satire that exposes uch hypoc- 
risy suggests that he satirist judges those values and standards worthy of 
being adhered to.26 Satire, then, to the extent i embodies the lower exposing 
and admonishing the higher is usually the bailiwick not of the utterly 
disempowered, but of the middling and ministerial sorts: it is the contempt 
of those who actually have to clean up the messes and implement the policies 
of those they contemn. 
Another kind of upward contempt more clearly associated with ierarchi- 
cal society (but not necessarily so) simply finds the high's standards of 
conduct and virtue and the social institutions which maintain them silly, a
cause for general mirth. Here the strategy is not o paint he higher as knaves, 
but to see them as clowns and fools. This is the feast of misrule. Here the 
standards and virtues of the powerful are meaningless. Only their power 
matters. The glee, mirth, laughter, the giggles, deny for the moment the forms 
of constrained deference. Tothe extent that pomposity is an attribute ofso 
much institutionalized power there isalways an entry for the glee and delight 
of seeing it punctured.27 And these little scenes of punctured pomposity need 
not occur only during periods et aside for it each year but whenever the 
contents of a chamber pot fell on the finely dressed lady or whenever a lord 
tripped over his sword. Imagine how hard it must have been for the footman 
to keep a straight face. Minifeasts ofmisrule, therein lies the image of this 
style of upward contempt. Contrast i with the usual style of downward 
contempt: sardonic, indifferent, smug, or disgusted, but all in all dismissive. 
Note too that he two styles of contempt can each have their defensive aspects. 
Downward contempt defends against the possibility ofimpudence by deny- 
ing the capacity of the offender to offend; upward contempt tries to carve out 
spaces of self-respect, bymaking the contemners ofone's respectability 
comic haracters .28 
Let me add as an aside that contempt ofthe higher's values and standards 
of conduct need not only lead to the mirthful contempt offeasts of misrule. 
Contempt can be the consequence of calculated self-interest that hrives at 
the expense of a superior whose values leave the door wide-open to fleece 
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him. The embezzlements of Chaucer's Manciple and Reeve29 were the simple 
price of a noble ethic that made work and attention tothe balance sheet a
contemptible adge of baseness. Masters were hardly unaware that such 
thieving went on. They supported and delighted ina comedic literature in 
which cunning servants outwitted them. But masters, I suppose, indulged in 
the fantasy that it was everybody else's reeves and stewards who were 
engaged in such activities. His own steward, after all, was always the xception 
that proved the rule. And yet you were almost supposed to be cheated by your 
servants; ifyou cared enough to put a stop to it you were base, illiberal, and 
small-minded. In that kind of society our moral standing and self-esteem 
were still safely independent ofwhat your servants or other lower-status 
people thought ofyou. 
Let me baldly state aproposition which, given the constraints of pace, I
can only sketch out as a rough story, more in the nature of an hypothesis. 
Upward contempt, as noted above, is marked by its reactive quality. Itis a 
payback of sorts, a response to the contempt being rained own from above. 
I suspect hat he style of upward contempt might vary with the style of 
contempt it is responding to and that both might be locked together ina circle 
of mutual e icitation a d influence. We might state it broadly thus: Hobbesian 
contempt, the style of disattending the other, of being indifferent to him or 
her, is something that characterizes the contempt ofthe high for the low in 
rigid hierarchies until we get to democracy when it becomes available as a 
style of upward contempt. In the pre-French-revolution west,Hobbesian 
indifference waslargely unavailable tothe low as a style of contempt, a  least 
in such a form that it evoked anxiety and concern among the high. In that 
world the public form of upward contempt was feasts of misrule, or the grim 
laughter of hypocrisy exposed. And one suspects that even these styles of 
upward contempt were not quite evenly distributed among the various 
rankings beneath the nobility. Feasts of misrule were for those at the social 
antipodes of the nobility, while the bitter delight in exposing hypocrisy was 
more a style, as indicated above, of those who were nearer the high, who 
actually had a chance to observe them closely, but were still contemned by 
them. 
Consider the broad types of social arrangements that follow and the 
various contempts hat maintain them. The heroic world, those cultures 
described inepic, cannot olerate oo much upward contempt ofthe sort hat 
questions the very value of honor itself. When we see someone dare risk it 
they are put down quickly and the hierarchy is maintained inspite of how 
comical it may look to the underlings. True, Thersites is given his say, but no 
one responds to the content of his speech. Odysseus' ad hominem assault is 
deemed to dispose of the issue.30 In the Icelandic sagas Thersites makes a
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brief appearance inthe guise of a poor farmer named Thorkel of Hafratindar. 
He has the temerity orefuse to warn the hero of an impending ambush 
because he finds the disputes of the honorable vaguely amusing and proposes 
instead to have fun from a safe distance watching them kill each other off. 
His arguments are not dealt with either, except ad hominem. He is killed for 
his derision.31 
Heroic society, however, knows of contempt; i  depends on it. Contempt 
is the correlative ofshame and humiliation. Contempt is what he honorable 
have right o show for the less honorable; itis part of the give-and-take of 
honor maintenance and honor acquisition. Fear of contempt orshame is what 
fuels the engine of honor. The literatures of heroic honor only rarely give us 
a glimpse of those too mean to be part of the competition for honor: Thersites 
and Thorkel suffer grievously for their contemptuous ridicule of the ethics of 
honor. Upward contempt oftheir sort is dangerous and not tolerable. When 
one laughs at one's superiors, one better make sure it is safely behind their 
back unless you have been granted the privilege of the fool or madman.32 
It is often the case that hose down one in the feud, that is, those who have 
been wronged and have not yet avenged themselves, may defy their oppo- 
nents, may in fact have contempt for them. Such contempt, however, is not 
upward contempt for it is bandied around within a group of rough equals, 
people in the game. The views of true inferiors, that is, of servants, the lowly, 
the nonplayers, do not interest the authors. Except, in the saga literature, for 
the women. In Iceland the thoughts ofthe wives, mothers, and daughters of
warrior men do count and they are nothing ifnot experts at subjecting their 
men to blistering contempt for their failings. They are masters of knowing 
how to shame and humiliate. Yet this too is not upward contempt. The women 
are charged with voicing the norms of honor. They are protecting the interests 
of the honor ethic.33 
For insistent interest inupward contempt we need hierarchies that are not 
as fluid as they are in the rough egalitarianism of honor systems. We need 
more formal or less mobile hierarchies that assign whole groups to a rank 
rather than a game in which individuals compete for relative rank. We also 
need certain instabilities inthe confidence with which the hierarchy is 
maintained. Consider these accounts in the generation r two that precede the 
French Revolution a d then some that follow reasonably soon upon it. 
In his Essay on Conversation, Fielding asks us to consider a setting in 
which we are to "suppose a conversation between Socrates, Plato, Aristotle 
and three dancing masters" (p. 267).34 The mere posing of the hypothetical 
suggests he problem: mutual contempt. The "heel sophists would be as little 
pleased with the company of the philosophers as the philosophers with 
theirs." What can be done to remedy the situation? Two courses are proposed: 
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raising the lower or lowering the higher. The former isimpossible. What must 
become of "our dancing masters" should Socrates discourse on the nature of 
the soul, Plato on the beauty of virtue, or Aristotle on occult qualities? "Would 
they not stare at one another with surprise and ... at our philosophers with 
contempt?" The philosophers must condescend to those topics which are 
mutually intelligible. 
Here is a little vignette in which mutual contempt between high and low 
is assumed. But note the tone. The dancing masters are no threat o order, 
only to interesting conversation. Their contempt for Plato and his pals types 
them as comically contemptible. If the contempt of dancing masters is all that 
philosophers have to concern themselves with, then they are safe indeed. The 
dancing master is not some rude mechanic. He is contemptible especially 
because his skill is one that he gets no credit for having. There are ideologies, 
among which we might count Christianity, that grudgingly concede virtue to 
tillers of the soil and to the builders of things, but the dancing master is simply 
a low abettor of the vanities of the privileged. Rude mechanics and tillers of 
the soil occasionally produce Wat Tylers and Jack Cades, but no one fears a 
dancing master, whose position makes him oily, serviceable, and obsequious. 
The only basis a dancing master has for laughing behind your back is his 
dancing skill and that is what he is paid to impart o you. So should he laugh 
at your son's ungainliness, he only calls into question his own skills as a 
teacher. This makes his smirking much less pointy than that of your footman 
or valet de chambre, or chambermaids. Ifone needs to suffer occasionally 
the contempt of the low, what better than have it come from the dancing 
master? In this world a gentleman is still in control. He is not anxious about 
the figure he cuts before his servants. He adopts a condescending confident 
and benevolent style: Thus Lord Chesterfield: 
There is a biensiance also with regard to people of the lowest degree; a gentleman 
observes it with his footman, even with the beggar in the street. He considers them as 
objects of compassion, not of insult; he speaks to neither d'un ton brusque, but corrects 
the one coolly, and refuses the other with humanity. (to his son, June 13, O.S. 1751) 
Nonetheless, Chesterfield's gentleman calmly keeps his money in his pocket. 
So the humanity of his refusal must simply be that he refrains from beating, 
berating, or ridiculing the beggar. The compassion he shows then does not 
lead to deeds either good or bad, but simply to inaction. Evidently, inaction 
counts as an improvement since the benchmark expectation is that beating 
and beratement are in order. 
But some fifty ears later we have a more anxious world. William Godwin 
can observe that 
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in England at the present day there are few poor men who do not console themselves, by 
the freedom of their animadversions upon their superiors. The new-fangled gentleman 
is by no means secure against having his tranquillity disturbed by their surly and pointed 
sarcasms. This propensity might easily be encouraged, and made conducive to the most 
salutary purposes.35 
In this threatening, panicky postrevolution world we soon begin to observe 
the nervous anxieties of the protomodern paranoid who feels that every 
servant, every inferior, is laughing athim. From the jovial contemplation of 
shallow and empty dancing masters having contempt for Plato and Aristotle 
we move to a world in which every encounter with asocial inferior holds the 
prospect of one's own humiliation. Democratic deals have, if not quite 
transformed theold style, surely altered expectations a d perceptions. Down- 
ward contempt becomes less complacent because it now suspects itis being 
paid back in kind. The high can no longer as easily maintain the Hobbesian 
contempt ofindifference. Only the insentient fool is indifferent to threat. One 
can pose as indifferent, butthis is a strategy designed to veneer fear and 
gnawing doubts about he figure one cuts in a world all of a sudden much 
more densely populated. The servants are no longer quite invisible. William 
Hazlitt, for instance, sees himself in a constant s ruggle with servants out to 
ridicule and humiliate him. "Their betters," hewrites, 
try all they can to set themselves up above them, and they try all they can to pull them 
down to their own level. They do this by getting up a little comic interlude, a daily, 
domestic, homely drama out of the odds and ends of the family failings, of which there 
is in general a plentiful supply or make up the deficiency with materials out of their own 
heads.36 
No point in preempting their mockery with kindness: "Any real kindness or 
condescension ly sets them the more against you. They are not to be taken 
in in that way." Notice again that he style of upward contempt is the style of 
comedy and drama. And it is not just your own servants who are cheeky and 
cheat, but "after a familiar conversation with a waiter at a tavern, you 
over-hear him calling you by some provoking ickname" (p. 107). 
This is a world in which the once invisible isnow monstrous and flexing 
its muscle. Breaches of deference are apparently becoming just frequent 
enough that here can be no longer any complacency in the smallest exchange, 
even though most of them still pass off with all deference intact and all 
respectfulness preserved. Hazlitt casts about for strategies tosave face. 
Condescension, humanity, he says, do not work. The low will simply hold 
you in greater contempt (here writing of dull and low people rather than 
specifically ofservants): 
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All the humility in the world will only pass for weakness and folly. They have no notion 
of such a thing. They always put their best foot forward; and argue that you would do 
the same if you had any such wonderful talents as people say. You had better, therefore, 
play off the great man at once-hector, swagger, talk big, and ride the high horse over 
them: you may by this means extort outward respect or common civility; but you will 
get nothing (with low people) by forbearance and good-nature but open insult or silent 
contempt.37 
Hazlitt is desperate and at loose ends. He is still enough of the world of 
rank and order that he can suppose that pretentiousness is a viable humiliation- 
avoiding strategy. Orwe may see him as aproto-Dostoyevskian underground 
man in which the defining trait of the new modern order is precisely the 
inevitability of humiliation, the inevitability of appearing contemptible to 
those whom you style yourself asbetter than. In this kind of world the only 
safe strategy for the preservation f a virtually unattainable self-esteem is 
paradoxically toseek humiliation.38 Be pretentious, put on airs, hector and 
upbraid the social inferior, because if you do not, they will see you as even 
more contemptible for being embarrassed about your own superiority. This 
is modernity itself: suffering upward contempt, self-loathing, and looking 
ridiculous tothose you fancy ourself better than. Instead of being admired, 
you are now spurned for your attempts at "democratic condescension" when 
lordly condescension is what is preferred. Wehave not quite reached me and 
the mason, but we are very close. 
We are in the midst of big changes here. But just what has changed? Are 
the low less deferential? Oris it that he same old cheekiness, buffoonery, 
and cunning is now seen where once it was safely disattendable? Is the 
change, in other words, more in the masters than in their lackeys? There were 
always cheeky servants and swindling stewards. Both provided their supe- 
riors with stock characters in the comedies that amused them. What I suspect 
Hazlitt observes are not his inferiors literally aughing inhis face where once 
they never would have dared, but that now types like him care obsessively 
about impudence and effrontery. They are panicked in seeing what hey were 
once able to ignore; they even imagine being laughed at when they are not. 
They are now actively concerned about how they are seen by their inferiors, 
and they fear that he arlier strategies ofdealing with effrontery a e no longer 
so easily available: caning, whipping, orcontemptuously refusing torecog- 
nize the affront. I  is this concern and this fear that look new. A hundred years 
earlier Swift could imagine his servants laughing athim, knows, in fact, that 
they do, but the tone is not of urgent desperation; it is a slapstick comedy in 
which servants smirk at their superior's bowel movements, guffaw at their 
pratfalls, and waste their lord's estate with their knavery and incompetence. 
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The fear is not of revolution, but of bankruptcy. The master isstill the master 
even in spite of frequent effrontery.39 
Hazlitt iswriting atthe outset of a new ordering ofassumptions about rank 
and status. Things, he feels, are in flux. But one wonders if he indeed is 
picking up on something different i  style from the usual cheekiness and 
impudence in the low-that was there from Plautus onward. The new 
democratic order allows for a real inversion ofcontempts. It is now the low 
who can indulge a Hobbesian contempt; they can treat heir superiors with 
indifference. The waitperson cares less about you than you do about him or 
her. Contrast this to how the Manciple's and the Reeve's contempt depended 
on assiduous concern and attention to their masters, on pleasing them, yes, 
but also on knowing them better than they knew themselves, onbecoming 
utterly indispensable to them, so as to construct the basis for their planned 
violations of their masters' trust. These cunning operators could never elax; 
there was no time that hey could be indifferent to their masters. The modem 
inferior might need to display obsequiousness insome settings but these 
settings are severely restricted. For the most part she does not give a damn 
and has her own spaces within which she has more important things to worry 
about: like competing for esteem among her peers. 
Tocqueville t lls another story in which e contrasts English and American 
customs of treating strangers. Why is it that Americans abroad greet each 
other but the English do not?' The short answer is that he English are 
nervous wrecks about the security of their ank; hence their distinctive 
reserve. According toTocqueville, the security ofan aristocracy of birth as 
given way to one of wealth and "the immediate r sult isan unspoken warfare 
between all the citizens.... Aristocratic pride still being a very strong force 
with the English and the boundaries of the aristocracy having become 
doubtful each man is constantly afraid lest advantage be taken of his famil- 
iarity." In America, on the other hand, 
where privileges of birth never existed and where wealth brings its possessor no peculiar 
right, men unacquainted with one another eadily frequent the same places and find 
neither danger nor advantage in telling each other freely what they think. Meeting by 
chance, they neither seek nor avoid each other. Their manner is therefore natural, frank, 
and open. One sees that there is practically nothing that they either hope or fear from 
each other and that hey are not concerned to show or to hide their social position. 
One wonders where he found this egalitarian utopia in the United States. It 
seems that before all this natural frank openness can take place it must be 
preceded by a judgment that he other person is indeed entitled tosuch free 
intercourse. The openness does not precede a determination of who exactly 
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.224 on Fri, 9 Jan 2015 15:06:52 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
494 POLITICAL THEORY / August 1995 
is entifled toit, but itself ollows on the ascertainment that one is dealing with 
a rough equal. Tocqueville iscomparing apples and oranges. He compares 
an Englishman who has yet o judge whether the person he is dealing with is 
his peer to Americans who have already made that judgment. The Englishman 
is wary of a person about whose xact rank he is uncertain; the American has 
that settled already because the place frequented will be a place for his kind 
of people to frequent. I am overstating it. There surely was something more 
open about America for broad ranges of men (and I mean men) when 
compared with Europe and even the large freedoms ofEngland. The English 
did and do cut distinctions of rank in much finer gradients han Americans. 
Yet I imagine that we would see these natural, frank Americans quickly 
settling among themselves who was a man to be reckoned with and who was 
not, who was to be deferred toand who was not, who was to be respected 
and who was not, even if this form of respect was less hedged in with 
formalized conventions than English relations between classes and ranks 
would be. If the class of people an American dmitted as his equals was more 
broadly recruited than an Englishman's, it was rather sharply delimited 
nonetheless and those boundaries were maintained as before by contempt and 
humiliation. Consider further the following extract from a letter a young New 
Yorker in 1852 writes home to his sister about his travels in the Caribbean: 
Here a black man is as good as a white one.... They do not hesitate to offer their hands 
to be shaken. Our washerwoman, sits upon the sofa in the cabin and talks as bold and 
loud as tho' the ship was hers. A washerwoman i  NY, a white one too, would not open 
her lips or think of sitting down. Nor would she offer to shake hands, as our Antiguan 
lady washerwoman did, which I politely refused to accept. The English say much against 
what they call equality in the states. They call it the most disagreeable part of their travels 
in our country that any man can ride who pays. If they think our equality disagreeable, I 
think theirs disgusting-for certainly our servants would not offer to shake hands with 
us, a thing often occurring in Antigua.41 
I want o limit myself to two main points about his wonderfully rich passage. 
It serves a useful corrective toTocqueville and to me. For Tocqueville it
makes the point hat equality comes in all kinds of sizes and shapes. And that 
the American size and shape still had plenty of room for ank and status, not 
only for race and gender as in the young traveler's letter, but we suspect 
among White men too, even, I would guess, on the egalitarian Western 
frontier. There is English equality and American equality, and each style 
seems to appall the other and provide the basis for competing contempts 
between Americans and the English. And what is it that makes them appall- 
ing? The impudence ofpeople clearly designated asinferior. Both equalities 
want ranks maintained ven if the grand theory of ranks has fallen on hard 
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.224 on Fri, 9 Jan 2015 15:06:52 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Miller / UPWARD CONTEMPT 495 
times. The English do not like the idea that American common carriers do 
not distinguish rank among paying passengers, while the American finds it 
disgusting that he English allow servants such familiarity as to think to shake 
hands with their social superiors (one suspects our traveler ismistaking a 
frontier colonial style as representative of a particularly English style). 
Upstartism of some sort (the passage indicates that not all upstartism has the 
same content) isas upsetting toAmericans a it is to the English in spite of 
the polemical point Tocqueville wishes to make. One wonders, by the way, 
how our young traveler thought it was possible to refuse the washerwoman's 
hand politely? Presumably, he, like Chesterfield to the beggar, assumes an 
appallingly ow benchmark in which caning, raping, or spitting inthe face is 
the norm. 
And what Mr. Dudley, our letter writer, shows me is that any claim about 
democracy liberating upward contempt to combat the usual fare being rained 
down from above must be accompanied with a much more nuanced and 
detailed story than I am providing here. Apparently, these two opposing 
contempts e tablished various equilibria at different times and places. The 
New York washerwoman is still all deference toMr. Dudley's mind. But is 
she? She may simply be utterly indifferent to his confident young prig, 
finding him at best a bore, at worst a pain in the butt. And what of our Black 
washerwoman in Antigua? Why assume with Mr. Dudley that she is simply 
too dense to understand the effect of her lack of deference on the young 
American man? She might very well be putting him on, exposing him to a 
very heavy dose of a more broadly comic contempt, rendering him the 
pretentious fool. It is not as if Mr. Dudley was able to ignore her. Quite the 
contrary. Hethought she was really worth writing home about. 
I conclude by restating my broad claim. Democracy does not destroy the 
conditions for upward contempt. In spite of the language of equality, we still 
recognize statuses, classes, and ranks that construct hierarchies. We can, in 
other words, still safely mark many instances of contempt as upward or 
conventionally downward. While some contempts surely represent compet- 
ing claims for dominance asin the style of contempt among rough equals in 
heroic society, other contempts relatively easily map onto the styles of 
contempt discoverable inrigidly hierarchical societies. Democracy, far from 
undoing the basis for contempts ofhigh and low, simply makes it possible 
for the low to add to the styles of upward contempt they already had in the 
old order. If the dominant form of upward contempt was, and still argely is, 
that of making the superior look ridiculous, either by feasts of misrule or by 
exposing the hypocrisy and incompetence of the superior, it became possible 
with role proliferation, role division, and democratic assumptions simply to 
be indifferent, to find more than enough space for oneself in which the 
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superior was disattendable and simply did not matter much at all. The low 
now have available to them the Hobbesian contempt ofsimply not caring to 
attend to their superiors and it is this which does so much to engender 
anxieties in the superior, for the superior cannot fathom that he or she could 
be so utterly disattendable. And what possible strategy is there to oppose to 
such indifference? Ignoring it? That is simply to battle his indifference with 
your feigned indifference. Caning is no longer permissible and firing and not 
hiring are severely circumscribed. It just might be that he mutuality of
contempt is much of what pluralistic democracy is all about. What democracy 
has done is arm the lower with some of the contempts that only the high had 
available to them before. This is no small achievement. It is much of what 
makes it so different from the old order. 
NOTES 
1. See Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1990), 136-40 for the notion that shame is the first-person c unterpart to disdain, contempt, or 
derision. On the distinction between shame and humiliation, see my discussion i William Ian 
Miller, Hwniliation (Cornell University Press, 1993), 134-48. 
2. Not that our concurrence will always be sufficient as a matterofjustice. We may not concur 
with the judgment and simply be behaving obstreperously or incorrigibly, or, we may concur 
with the judgment and be the victim of an unjust social order that deprives us of the ability to 
make sufficiently autonomous evaluations ofour lot in that particular social order. 
3. James C. Scott in his Domination and the Arts of Resistance (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1990), as his title suggests, deals with the styles of resistance the lower take 
with regard to the higher, but he plays this out almost solely in societies with institutionalized 
slavery, untouchability, or racial domination. His discussion, somewhat too sentimental and 
pious for my tastes, only indirectly alludes to the emotional force motivating the "hidden 
transcripts" of the disempowered. Hisdiscussion largely assumes that resentment, i dignation, 
and fear mark the style. Contempt makes only a rare appearance ( .g., pp. 2, 199). Many of 
Scott's points are anticipated byM. P. Baumgartner, "Social Control from Below," Toward a 
General Theory of Social Control, 2 vols., ed. Donald Black (New York: Academic Press, 1984), 
1:303-45. See Arlie Russell Hochschild, The Managed Heart (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1983) for a rich ethnography of the costs of emotion management a d constraint among 
flight a tendants. 
4. I realize "fissure" is rather prissy, but the more direct alternatives aretoo great a breach 
of decorum atpresent. Please know I struggled with this. 
5. My view of the significance of tattooing dates me. Now that upper-middle-class young of 
both sexes get tattoos the relation between tattoos and notions of vulgarity will undergo s me 
shift. Still the classbound significance of tattoos i likely to survive for some time the recent 
upper-middle-class attraction to them. There is not much difficulty in discerning the difference 
between tattoos designed to shock parents and those designed to identify with them. 
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.224 on Fri, 9 Jan 2015 15:06:52 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Miller / UPWARD CONTEMPT 497 
6. On another day, he and my wife met each other in a kind of dueling T-shirts: hers read 
"save endangered mammals" and his "crack kills" inscribed beneath a cartoon of a human being 
crushed between the cheeks of a naked butt. His, of course, was meant o be funny, not only 
in its scatology but by its piercing the pretensions of the grave style of a somber and 
self-consciously virtuous "concerned citizenry"; the perverse result is that my wife's T-shirt 
ends up as funny as his. Funny how most of us live so as to justify the not-so-friendly stereotypes 
others impose on us. 
7. See further Miller, Humiliation, 136-48. 
8. See Robert C. Solomon, The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotion (Garden 
City: Anchor Press, 1976), 292, who asks us to imagine a cockroach, then a six-foot cockroach. 
On the grotesque, the obligatory cite is Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. Helene 
Iswolsky (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984). 
9. On disgust see Paul Rozin and April E. Fallon, "APerspective on Disgust," Psychological 
Review 94, no. 1 (1987): 23-41. 
10. Before you excoriate me, would you treat he unambivalent expression of contempt by 
Ice-T to the same condemnation?: "Let me tell you something about the masses. You ever watch 
wrestling? Hulk Hogan and all that, guys jumping off the ropes? And the arena's always packed? 
Those same people vote, man." John Anderson, "Ice-T's Role Reversal," Newsday, March 3, 
1991, pt. 2, 3. Ice-T's views on democracy reduplicate those of the conservative anti-democrats 
in England during the decades following the French Revolution. I find in Ice-T's espousal of the 
same anti-democratic v ews a paradoxical emblem of the triumph of democracy, for the contempt 
of the people that once was a prerogative of high-Toryism is now readily available to everyone. 
11. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 4-5, throughout. 
12. But then am I not simply projecting my self-contempt, making it his contempt for me? I 
do not want to get lost in this problem except to note a few things: if we are to function 
competently inthis world, we have to be reasonably good at discerning the motivations and 
intentions of others. We do it all the time. To be sure, some of us are better at it than others and 
those who are better at it seem to have, over the long haul, a competitive advantage over those 
who are not. Those inept at discerning motivation in others get easily swindled; they are also 
more likely to give offense and thus elicit more hostile reactions, and so on (see my " 'I can take 
a hint': Social Ineptitude, Embarrassment, and The King of Comedy," Michigan Quarterly 
Review 33, no. 2 [1994], 322-344). That still does not answer whether I am projecting or not, 
but it seems that I am no more likely to know whether I am projecting than I am likely to know 
his motivation. Consider that our therapeutic society seems to depend on an implicit assumption 
that we are less likely to know ourselves than certain licensed others are likely to know us. 
Furthermore, it may not be all that important whether I am right about this particular interaction 
as that such an interaction as I describe seems to make complete social and psychological sense; 
that is, there is nothing all that surprising inmy account either about my inner states or about 
his. Nor do I feel it necessary to apologize for an inevitable subjectivity inthe account: how, 
after all, are we to get at motivation without the datum of our own inner states? 
13. Notice how the type of work he does will affect he content of his contempt. As a mason 
he has a skill which he prides himself on not being easily reproduced in others without years of 
training. If, however, he were simply providing a lawn service, or even painting, he might look 
at the very fact that I have hired him as an indication of my moral failing. Shouldn't any 
reasonably manly man be able to paint his own house or cut his lawn, especially someone who 
has a schedule that allows him to be home at eleven in the morning or by three in the afternoon? 
14. See Leviathan, pt. 2, chap. 6. 
15. A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. 2, pt. 2, sec. 10. 
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16. Consider, however, that he superior may blame the lower's inability to recognize under 
what circumstances certain forms of deference should be due. The lower's ignorance would not 
excuse his offense but simply reveal a reckless disregard of the obvious. A swift caning might 
be considered appropriate instruction. This kind of instruction looks vaguely similar to the kind 
of discipline meted out by constituted authority when it invokes, for example, the notion of 
contempt of court. Failure to show deference becomes a kind of strict liability offense in the eyes 
of authority. Ignorance is no excuse. 
17. "An Essay on Conversation," vol. 1, Miscellaneous Writings, ed. William E. Henley, The 
Complete Works of Henry Fielding (New York: Croscup and Sterling, 1902), 251, 262. 
18. To his son October 9, O.S. 1746. This sentiment is repeated in about ten other letters 
almost verbatim. Also: "Wrongs are often forgiven, but contempt never is. Our pride remembers 
it for ever" (July 1, 1748, to his son). 
19. "Of all the Fops in Nature, none are so ridiculously contemptible as the Wouldbees." 
London Mag. 1.240, cited in Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. would-be, B. sb. 
20. See, generally, the work of Paul Ekman and Carroll Izard. For example, Paul Ekman, 
"An Argument for Basic Emotions," Cognition and Emotion 6, nos. 3-4 (1992): 169-200; and 
Carroll Izard, The Face of Emotion (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971). For a lucid 
critique of these theories ee Jerome Neu, " 'A Tear is an Intellectual Thing,' " Representations 
19 (1987): 35-61. 
21. Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1965), 247-61. 
22. I am painting broadly here. In the actual micropolitics of any particular encounter, all 
kinds of competing factors may alter the precise style of mutual status adjustment. Given role 
proliferation, pluralism, and the significance of certain public spaces, the conventionally ow 
may at certain times actually be able to compete freely as to whose contempt gets styled as 
reactive and whose as constitutive. For instance, it makes a difference that the mason and me 
met on my front porch rather than, for example, in a working-class bar. Upward contempt, by 
my reckoning, always has some consciousness of its own reactiveness. When it ceases to be thus 
aware we have either the inadvertent offensiveness of the country bumpkin or the open 
competition for dominance played out among people contesting their ank. 
23. The hiring of someone to do manual abor constructs he relative ranking in favor of the 
hirer. But when one hires (we do not even say hire), but rather engages, or retains, or sees a 
doctor, lawyer, or some other person engaged in some of the more magical and suspect 
professions, itis often the hireling rather than the hirer who occupies the higher anking. 
24. Upward contempt can also make use of the self-loathing ofthe lower (if present) to make 
the higher the object of contempt. Thus, in certain instances of upward contempt, he pleasure 
of the lower is not quite separable from the knowledge that he superior you hold in contempt is
at least in some respects lower even than you yourself are; lower, in other words, than the low. 
25. Here we would want to distinguish t e phenomenon of the high not living up to their own 
standards from finding the standards that he high aspire to risible; see further below. 
26. "Satire is an unwilling tribute to power; but it also implies the recognition of a certain 
inevitability inthe thing satirized, a lack of any constructive alternative": R. W. Southern, The 
Making of the Middle Ages (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1953), 154. 
27. Note that kings and lords would innoculate themselves omewhat against the risk of 
punctured pomposity by privileging fools and lower-class jesters who were allowed to ridicule 
their superiors to their faces. One way to deal with those laughing behind your back is to make 
them perform some of the same routine before you defuse most of its danger. The institution f
the privileged fool also indicates that the higher were in some respects willing and able to see 
themselves as their inferiors saw them. 
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28. The mirthfulness of the feast of misrule style of upward contempt is plainly not 
Nietzsche's value-transfornming ressentiment, although the moralizing style of upward contempt 
has clear resemblences to it. See Genealogy of Morals 1.10. 
29. The Manciple's skills in thievery were especially noteworthy because, as steward of the 
temple housing the best lawyers in England, he was able to fleece his masters; in other words, 
he fleeced the fleecers. And of the Reeve it is said, that "His lord wel koude he plesen subtillyJ 
To yeve and lene [give and lend] hym of his [the lord's] owene good." (Canterbury Tales, A. vv. 
569-88, 612-13). 
30. See The Iliad 11.214-82. 
31. Laxdoela saga, chaps. 49, 52. 
32. Note that Thersites tries to gain such privilege by playing the clown. It is denied him. 
33. For more on the remarkable women of the Icelandic sagas see William Ian Miller, 
Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1990), esp. 212-13. 
34. No figure comes in for more generalized contempt in higher circles in the first half of 
the eighteenth century than the dancing master. By the end of the century the dancing master has 
passed his unenviable torch to the hair dresser. See the wonderful account of the significance of 
references to hair dressers by Don Herzog, forthcoming in Representations. 
35. William Godwin, The Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793; bk. 1, chap. 5) ed. 
F.E.L. Priestly (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1946), 3:141. 
36. Hazlitt, "On the Knowledge of Character" (1821), William Hazlitt: Selected Writings, 
ed. Ronald Blythe (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), 105. 
37. Hazlitt, "On the Disadvantages of Intellectual Superiority" (1821), ibid., 188. 
38. I discuss humiliation-avoidance strategies at length in Humiliation. The general obser- 
vation is that he risk of humiliation i heres in pretension, but that so dolorous is the social world 
that pretensions of some sort are never completely avoidable. Hence the despairing strategy of 
underground man to seek out humiliation soas to have it on his own terms. Note too that Hazlitt, 
and in a lesser way my account of the mason, suggest, in constrast to Nietzsche, that self-con- 
sciousness is a function of the higher's fears of the mockery of the low rather than a function of 
the low's resentment ofthe high. 
39. See Jonathan Swift, Directions to Servants, ed. Herbert Davis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1959). 
40. Democracy in America, II.iii.2. 
41. Letter of Thomas C. Dudley, a young ship's purser from Yonkers, New York, to his sister 
Fanny, 16 June, 1852 in the Dudley collection at the Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
William Ian Miller is a professor of law at the University ofMichigan. He has a Ph.D. 
in English and a law degree, both from Yale. He specializes in the social history of saga 
Iceland, but is more recently attempting a social theory of emotions, especially the 
status-determining emotions of humiliation, shame, contempt, and disregard. His recent 
books include Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law and Society in Saga Iceland 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) and Humiliation (Cornell University 
Press, 1993). He is presently working on a book on disgust. 
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